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Petra TschakertAbstract
An average global 2°C warming compared to pre-industrial times is commonly understood as the most important
target in climate policy negotiations. It is a temperature target indicative of a fiercely debated threshold between
what some consider acceptable warming and warming that implies dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system and hence to be avoided. Although this 2°C target has been officially endorsed as scientifically sound
and justified in the Copenhagen Report issued by the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2009, the large majority of countries (over two-thirds) that
have signed and ratified the UNFCCC strongly object to this target as the core of the long-term goal of keeping
temperatures below a certain danger level. Instead, they promote a 1.5°C target as a more adequate limit
for dangerous interference. At COP16 in Cancun, parties to the convention recognized the need to consider
strengthening the long-term global goal in the so-called 2013–2015 Review, given improved scientific knowledge,
including the possible adoption of the 1.5°C target. In this perspective piece, I examine the discussions of a structured
expert dialogue (SED) between selected Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) authors, myself included,
and parties to the convention to assess the adequacy of the long-term goal. I pay particular attention to the uneven
geographies and power differentials that lay behind the ongoing political debate regarding an adequate target for
protecting ecosystems, food security, and sustainable development.
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Uneven geographiesBackground
The political origin and subsequent critique of the
2°C target
To date, the history of the 2°C target is well understood
[1]. In the 1960s and 1970s, doubling CO2 concentration
scenarios estimated an approximate 2°C warming.
Economist William Nordhaus [2], often cited as the
source of the targets, used 2°C in his early cost-benefit
analyses for emission reductions, albeit as a heuristic
and not a normative policy prescription. Shortly there-
after, a reframing of the climate question shifted the dis-
cussion from emission reductions to risks of climate
change at levels potentially tolerable or disruptive and
harmful. In 1991, the first target-based approaches to cli-
mate policy emerged, including the so-called ‘traffic lightCorrespondence: petra@psu.edu
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unless otherwise stated.system’ to delineate distinct levels of risk expressed in
temperature rise per decade and associated sea level rise.
They ranged from limited risk and damage (green) to ex-
tensive risk and damage (amber) and significant societal
disruptions and possible tipping points (red) [3]. The
boundary between green and amber was roughly associ-
ated with a 1°C increase while the boundary between
amber and red approximated 2°C [1]. Only 5 years later,
the 1996 European Union declaration proposed the 2°C
target as the maximum allowable global temperature
above pre-industrial times by 2100, mainly to avoid
major losses to threatened ecosystems such as coral
reefs [4].
Consequently, the 2°C target became an anchor in
mitigation debates, reaffirmed then in environmental cir-
cles and embraced in several high-level policy domains,
stretching from Greenpeace in the early 1990s to the G8
meeting in 2005. At COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, the
2°C target was officially sanctioned as essential policyis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
Tschakert Climate Change Responses  (2015) 2:3 Page 2 of 11guidance, with the hope that it may subsequently be-
come a legal goal in a new climate agreement. ‘We agree
that deep cuts in global emissions are required according
to science, as documented in the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment
Report with a view to reduce global emissions so as to
hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees
Celsius…’ [5]. In Cancun, at COP16 in 2010, parties
agreed to reduce global greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions to keep the global average temperature below 2°C
above pre-industrial levels, which became the so-called
long-term global goal.
Despite the usefulness of the 2°C target as a ‘boundary
object’ between science and policy makers [1] and its
partial yet insufficient success in triggering political ac-
tion, the target has been subject to repeated and partially
severe criticism. Among parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
many Caribbean states proclaimed already at COP15
that a 2°C temperature rise was unacceptable as a safe
threshold for the protection of small island states and
that even a 1.5°C increase would undermine the survival
of their communities. At COP16 in Cancun 1 year later,
the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) reiterated
this claim. Several least developed countries (LDCs)
joined AOSIS insisting on a long-term goal that would
lower rising global average temperatures to below 1.5°C
warming, accounting jointly for more than 100 of all
countries most vulnerable to the negative impacts of cli-
mate change. This majority (>70%) among the parties
comprises, besides the low-lying small island states, es-
sentially all low- and middle-income countries, with the
exception of two lower middle-income countries (India,
Indonesia) and a few upper-middle income countries
such as China, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico; the parties
that support a 2°C target are all high-income countries
and nine upper middle-income countries, the above
four included [6]. The latter evidently unite the high-
emitting, high-income OECD nations.
Critique of the 2°C target also came from scientists,
ranging from climate scientists to economists, political
scientists, human geographers, and other social scien-
tists. Arguably best known is James Hansen’s critique
that, a decade ago, disapproved of the 2°C upper thresh-
old for climate safety as irresponsible, arguing that it
inappropriately accounted for climate sensitivity and cli-
mate feedback processes and, hence, committed the
planet to significant warming [7]. Hansen subsequently
urged abandoning the 2°C target altogether and commit-
ting to a 1°C danger limit [8] or a 350 ppm CO2 target
[9], which is lower than today’s 400 ppm. ‘[T]he oft-
stated goal to keep global warming less than two degrees
Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) is a recipe for global
disaster, not salvation.’ [10]. Others consider the 2°Ctarget scientifically unfounded, due to insufficient data
and reasoning [11,12]. Further scientists and environ-
mentalists, including Paul Randers and Jorgen Gilding
who outlined the need for emergency actions as part of
their ‘One Degree War Plan’ [13], as well as Greenpeace
and the Climate Action Network International have now
also been advocating for limiting warming below 1.5°C.
David Victor and Charles Kennel [12], while acknow-
ledging that the 2°C target represents a bold and easy to
grasp goal, contend that it is both essentially unachiev-
able and impractical. Their suggestion to ‘ditch’ the 2°C
warming target has now triggered a wave of contest-
ation, mainly among climate scientists.
Less well known perhaps is a critique from feminist
social scientists who interrogate what may be deemed
‘acceptable’ and what may be ‘dangerous’, and for whom,
and who contest the global community as a homoge-
neous entity. Joni Seager, for instance, demonstrates how
notions of acceptability always mirror ‘a prism of privil-
ege, power, and geography’ [14]. She argues that those
for whom a 2°C target appears to be a relatively safe bet
are the richer countries in temperate latitudes, as well as
politicians and economists from the global North deeply
entrenched in a masculinized rationality that nature can
be controlled and that in the imminent climate race with
inevitable winners and losers they will be among the
former. Seager rejects the notion of a 2°C target as a real
geophysical threshold that neatly distinguishes between
little and much danger; instead, she argues that the
target represents the point ‘when global warming
“comes” home to the rich world, …. when “their” [the
others’] problems are likely to become “ours”’ [14].
Diana Liverman [15] also emphasizes the uneven spatial
geographies associated with global danger levels as even
small temperature rises and other risks threatening vul-
nerable livelihoods in one locale would be offset by gains
and benefits somewhere else. This unevenness, however,
disappears in the aggregate and masks very concrete and
embodied, lived experiences of danger. Moreover, danger
at different temperature thresholds, as schematically il-
lustrated in the iconic Burning Embers graphic intro-
duced by the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report, conveys
considerable risk for certain unique and threatened sys-
tems at 2°C warming, such as glaciers, arctic and coastal
ecosystems, as well as indigenous and small island com-
munities. Yet, it obscures risks for millions of poor and
vulnerable populations in the arguably less charismatic
drylands. What is considered unique and threatened
emerges from value judgments that, so far, have largely
been in the scientific eye of the beholder, not the one
endangered.
A degree of average global warming may indeed be the
most convenient and compelling mathematical construc-
tion (the mean) of the overall severity of climate change
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mate change risk inadequately capture the complexity of
the climate system [12], it also poorly reflects locally ex-
perienced temperature increases and extremes and
hence the large variation across regions and continents.
No single person or any single species faces a global
average. Archbishop Desmond Tutu was one of the most
outspoken non-delegate critics in Copenhagen in 2009,
drawing attention to the fact that a 2°C global average
would mean 3°C–3.5°C or more for Africa, hence the
‘cooking of the continent’ and its condemnation to incin-
eration and no modern development [16]. Abundant evi-
dence from around the world confirms the uneven and
localized impacts of already occurring climate change
(0.8°C average global warming since pre-industrial
times). This evidence does not only consider rising tem-
peratures and sea level rise but also shifting trends in
rainfall patters and extreme events and impacts such
as floods, droughts, and heat waves. This evidence is
most recently assessed and summarized in Working
Group II of the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), for
the world regions and sectors including natural and
managed systems, urban and rural areas, economic
services, human health, livelihoods and poverty, and
human security [17].
Most problematically, the notion of a scientifically
sound and globally tractable 2°C target is often errone-
ously mapped onto Article 2 of the UNFCCC; an im-
plied connection is made between 2° and ‘dangerous’,
although no specific number is provided in the conven-
tion’s text [14]. In fact, the convention does not define a
dangerous level for global warming or a limit for GHG
concentrations, arguably on purpose. It states as its ul-
timate objective to ‘achieve … stabilization of green-
house gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer-
ence with the climate system. Such a level should be
achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosys-
tems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that
food production is not threatened and to enable eco-
nomic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.’
Rather than deliberating different danger metrics or
avoiding serious damage, continuous debates revolve
around pinpointing what precisely this temperature
threshold for climate safety ought to be and how it
translates into acceptable and unacceptable risk and
damage and for whom. In the following section, I reflect
on science-policy debates on adequate warming targets,
through the lens of the fourth UNFCCC structured
expert dialogue at COP20 in Lima, Peru, in early De-
cember 2014. My aim is to highlight arguments that
explore whether a 1.5°C warming target by the end of the
21st century would indeed be a safer danger limit for hu-
manity and, if yes, whether it is still within reach.Inside the process: structured expert dialogues
Parallel to the COP16 decision to use the 2°C target as
the long-term global goal to reduce GHG emissions, the
parties also decided to periodically review the adequacy
of this long-term goal and progress toward achieving it,
in light of the ultimate objective of the convention. More
importantly perhaps was the agreement to consider
strengthening the goal, reflecting the best available scien-
tific knowledge. The latter explicitly suggests consider-
ation of a 1.5°C target, a limit that would potentially be
safer but also require much more drastic mitigation
action to avoid crossing over into a global ‘danger zone’.
This 2010 decision yielded commitment to the 2013–
2015 Review. Upon its completion, the Conference of
the Parties (COP) is expected to incorporate findings
into the ADP, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, established in
2011. The mandate of the ADP is to develop a new
protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome
with legal force, to be completed and then adopted at
COP21 in Paris in December 2015. This instrument
would come into effect and be implemented in 2020. It
is expected that it will stipulate one or the other
temperature target as a legally binding goal.
At COP18 in Doha in 2012, it was agreed to establish
a so-called structured expert dialogue (SED) to ac-
company the 2013–2015 Review, under the guidance
of the convention’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and
Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for
Implementation (see Figure 1). The purpose of the SED
is to ensure scientific integrity of the review process
through a series of workshops and expert meetings and
facilitate fruitful dialogue between experts and parties to
the convention. Two co-facilitators, one from an Annex I
party (all OECD countries and economies in transition)
and the other from a non-Annex I party (all other
nations), oversee the process and report back to the
COP. Between June 2013 and June 2014, three SEDs had
already taken place. As a coordinating lead author of
the IPCC’s AR5 (Chapter 13 Livelihoods and Poverty,
Working Group II Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability)
and a member of the core writing team of the AR5
Synthesis Report, I was invited to take part in the
fourth SED organized at COP20 in Lima in December
2014. Updates on the 2013–2015 Review are accessible on
the UNFCCC website [18].
The reports from the first three SEDs—all before
COP20—reveal the central role of the 1.5°C versus 2°C
debate in exchanges between experts and parties. During
SED1 [20], a representative of AOSIS, not surprisingly,
requested assessments of impacts and risk at several
levels of CO2 concentrations and associated temperature,
including explicitly at 1.5°C. This insight would be particu-
larly crucial in order to better understand the risks of
Figure 1 Phases of the 2013–2015 review, UNFCCC [19].
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irreversible for human, physical, and ecological systems.
During SED2 [21], the main findings from Working
Group I were reiterated, namely that the global surface
temperature is projected to exceed 1.5°C by 2100 rela-
tive to 1850–1900 for three of the four Representative
Concentration Pathways (RCPs; the emission scenarios
used in the Working Group I (WGI) of the AR5), ex-
cept for the lower range of the most optimistic one
(RCP2.6), although it could be as high as 2.3°C even
under this scenario. Parties requested more details re-
garding regional differences to be caused by a 1.5°C
and 2°C warmer world. From a science perspective, this
information is difficult to provide, as the IPCC com-
pared global and regional differences by RCP rather
than by temperature differentials. One could, however,
approximate the near-term (~2030–40) impacts of
RCP2.6 with a 1.5°C warming above pre-industrial times
by 2100.
This emerging incongruity between the IPCC tem-
perature ranges and the policy-relevant yet contested
temperature/danger targets became even more pro-
nounced in SED3 [22]. Explaining the risk assessment
approach employed in Working Group II to evaluate
current risks, risks in the near-term (2030–2040), and
risks in the long-term (2080–2100) in both a 2°C and
4°C warmer world, an IPCC expert showed increasingrisks with increasing temperatures, and less and less
potential for adaptation to reduce these risks. Responding
to a renewed request to provide details on the specific con-
sequences of a 1.5°C warming, the science expert pointed
to the scarce literature that assesses impacts at this level,
hence the limited representation in the AR5. More em-
phasis on this danger level in the assessment would not
have been possible as all available literature has already
been considered.
Best evidence, though, comes from terrestrial ecosys-
tems, suggesting significant differences in projected risk
between 1.5°C and 2°C, especially in the Polar Regions,
high mountain areas, and the Tropics. As for coral reefs,
a temperature rise capped at <1.5°C would be needed to
protect at least 50% of all existing coral reefs [22]. From
the perspective of human and agricultural systems, the
difference between a 1.5°C and 2°C global temperature
increase is distinctly more difficult to assess as global
average conditions become fuzzy when applied to local
levels where impact studies are most abundant. Simi-
larly, the adaptation literature typically does not distin-
guish between specific temperature limits and risk levels.
Nonetheless, expected risks and impacts under these
two temperature targets differ for low-lying coastal re-
gions and dryland farming systems where significant
threats and losses are already experienced. This is safe to
suggest, even if global average warming levels cannot be
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estimate geographically and culturally specific danger
thresholds.
While there is little doubt that risks of extreme events
will increase with every notch on the temperature scale
and hence heighten the risk of dangerous interference,
the current literature on which the IPCC AR5 is based
does not allow for extracting comprehensible conse-
quences across sectors and regions regarding this 0.5°C
temperature differential. A more insightful way perhaps
of portraying differences is shown in Table 1; it illus-
trates CO2-eq concentration levels, cumulative CO2
emissions, and the likelihoods of meeting specific
temperature targets by 2100 [23]. Staying below a global
1.5°C warming compared to pre-industrial times is un-
likely for all concentration levels >500 ppm and more
unlikely than likely for the 430–480 ppm range. Insuffi-
cient models exist to evaluate <430 ppm.
Expert-party exchanges during the first three SEDs
with respect to what temperature target matters mirror
earlier yet more antagonistic discussions at some of the
AR5 approval sessions, and the political weight they
carry. For instance, in Yokohama in March 2014 [24],
authors and delegates spent a considerable amount of
time negotiating the temperature axis of an updated ver-
sion of the Reasons for Concern (also known as the
Burning Embers diagram) during the approval of the
Summary for Policy Makers of WGII. The draft version
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Source: IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report, 2014 [3]. *Footnotes explained in the original.to the period 1986–2005 (left thermometer in Figure 2),
starting from 0°C change, consistent with the scientific
baseline used in all three working groups. However, as a
response to the insistence on the part of some parties,
including St. Lucia, Saudi Arabia, and Bolivia, a second
thermometer was added to the right, illustrating ap-
proximate change since pre-industrial times (1850–
1900), despite the much smaller available scientific data
sets. No instrumental records allow going back as far as
1750. For many delegates, it was fundamental to not
omit in this crucial figure the 0.61°C change that had
been accumulating between 1850 and 1900 and the re-
cent temperatures (1986–2005), change that results in
concrete impacts felt already around the globe.
Moreover, fierce debates erupted over the visual
highlighting of certain temperature targets in the graphic
[24]. The draft version of the figure included two dotted
horizontal lines, one at 2°C and the other at 4°C. Again,
St. Lucia, supported by Dominica, Jamaica, Tuvalu,
Cuba, Mali, France, and then also Germany, requested a
third dotted line at 1.5°C, arguing that this line would be
highly policy-relevant. Yet, others considered it policy-
prescriptive and hence inappropriate for the IPCC whose
mandate it is to be no more than policy-relevant. A
compromise to add dotted lines at all 0.5°C increments,
offered by the IPCC authors as well as Belgium, Austria,
the U.S., and others, was rejected. In the end, the
graphic was approved, without any horizontal lines,




Likelihood of staying below a specific
temperature level over the 21st century
(relative to 1850–1900)*
2100 1.5°C 2°C 3°C 4°C
s have explored levels below 430 ppm CO2-eq*




























Figure 2 Climate-related risks expressed through the Five Reasons for Concern. The color shading indicates the additional risks due to
climate change when a temperature level is reached and then sustained or exceeded. Source: IPCC AR5 WGII Summary for Policy Makers,
2014. [17].
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from a science perspective. Yet, these disputes are polit-
ically vital and indicative of the high stakes in negotiat-
ing warming targets and the resulting consequences as
part of the UNFCCC 2013–2015 Review.
During the approval negotiations of the Synthesis
Report in Copenhagen in October 2014, debates on miti-
gation pathways prompted Bolivia and Nicaragua to ob-
ject to the acceptance of the 2°C over the 1.5°C target,
upon which the IPCC Chair reminded the parties of the
panel’s mandate to assess consequences of a 2°C warm-
ing [25]. Differences regarding the inclusion of 1.5°C in a
contested box on AR5 information relevant to Article 2
of the UNFCCC, defining the ultimate goal of the con-
vention, remained unresolved. Several parties considered
an explicit reference to 1.5°C as policy-prescriptive and
again inappropriate for an IPCC document. This two-
page box was ultimately not included in the released
Synthesis Report. The ongoing UNFCCC 2013–2015
Review and the possible consideration of changing the
target for the long-term goal from 2°C to 1.5°C ‘may
have spilled over into the IPCC process’ and preventedagreement on a piece of information the parties them-
selves had explicitly requested [26].
At the fourth structured expert dialogue (SED4) at
COP20 in Lima, a 2-day event, the experts’ task was
to provide evidence that would allow for assessment of
the adequacy of the long-term global goal in terms of
preventing unacceptable consequences for natural and
human systems and risk management. Evidently, for rep-
resentatives of the IPCC, our place was not to proclaim
what may be adequate and what may be acceptable but
rather to present information from the report that
speaks to impacts and risks at various temperature
levels. First reviewed were consequences under a 1.5°C
versus a 2°C world for ecosystems and food production
[27]. With reference to the former, the difference be-
tween the two temperature targets would increase risk
for marine species from moderate to high, accounting
for both ocean warming and ocean acidification, with
20%–50% of corals and mollusks affected. Limiting
warming at 1.5°C would still yield a number of avoided
impacts, such as keeping sea level rise <1 m, saving half
of the world’s corals, and leaving some of the Arctic
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largely negative from the 2030s onward with more se-
vere impacts after 2050. A representative of the World
Health Organization stressed that there was no ‘safe
limit’ for health, as current impacts and risks from cli-
mate change and variability were already unacceptable,
impacting people’s health significantly and inequitably
[28]. A poignant example are excess deaths during heat
waves (e.g., >10,000 deaths during the Russian heat wave
in 2010), and still higher risks expected under a 1.5°C
warmer world (e.g., rise in undernutrition, food- and
water-borne infections, and occupational ill-health).
My charge at SED4 was to illustrate consequences
from climate change for sustainable development with
relevance for assessing the adequacy of the long-term
global goal [29]. Given that the AR5 WGII does in
no specific chapter assess impacts on sustainable de-
velopment, not under a 2°C world and even less so
under a 1.5°C future, a cross-sectional view seemed
most opportune. My specific emphasis was on cli-
mate change impacts on livelihoods, migration, and
conflict, relevant to and overlaid onto the summary
risks as depicted in the first four of the five Reasons
for Concern (see Figure 2). As expected, the differen-
tiation between 1.5°C and 2°C danger for sustainable
development remains challenging.
Significant evidence regarding unique and threatened
social systems exists in the literature for indigenous
people such as the Inuit and the Sami in Arctic Regions,
and some for high mountain communities such as the
Aymara in the Andes; they indicate moderate risks
already under the current 0.8°C warming. Between the
current level and an expected 2°C temperature rise, indi-
genous and other unique human systems will face in-
creasingly higher risks of losing their land, their cultural
and natural heritage, community cohesion, sense of
place, and identity. This would disrupt cultural practices
embedded in their livelihoods, with very limited options
for successful adaptation. Given that the assessment of
risks under a 2°C warmer world is largely based on ex-
pert judgment, drawing upon the best available scientific
literature and empirical, context-specific evidence rather
than model simulations, it is not possible to differentiate
which communities may cross a lower 1.5°C global dan-
ger threshold first and where. Moreover, due to the fact
that risks are a result of climatic hazards (including but
not limited to increasing temperature) combined with
exposure and vulnerability, the state-of-the-art scientific
knowledge is unable to confidently pinpoint a global
danger level that adequately represents locally experi-
enced realities. Vulnerability is dependent on adaptive
potentials as well as uneven development pathways and
inequalities baked into any society, most often along the
lines of gender, race, age, class, ethnicity or indigeneity,and (dis-)ability. Despite these caveats, even the flatten-
ing aggregate assessment for unique and threatened sys-
tems signals high risks at 2°C warming, bordering on
‘very high’. This ‘very high risk’ category required, for the
first time in the history of the iconic Burning Embers
diagram, a new color (purple).
Extreme events such as floods, hurricanes, and heat
waves are also expected to cause high risk in a 2°C
warmer world, yet not very high. These events will put
at significant danger disadvantaged populations in mega-
cities like Lagos, Mexico City, or Shanghai, people whose
livelihoods are dependent on natural resources such as
agriculturalists and pastoralists and at risk from conflicts
over scarce resources between them, and people who are
displaced or forced to migrate. Under extreme events,
the ability to move at 1°C, 1.5°C, or 2°C global warming
will likely depend on factors other than temperature.
Rather, people who are trapped due to high environmen-
tal vulnerability and low levels of well being will be the
first to cross over into a danger zone, at all levels of
temperature increase, although many more with contin-
ued increases.
Regarding distribution of impacts, the zone between a
1.5°C and 2°C warming reveals increasing aggregate risks
from moderate to close to high. Again, danger and risk
will be unevenly distributed, with higher risks and earlier
impacts for socially marginalized groups, the elderly and
children, and outdoor workers, as well as for people who
may shift from transient to chronic states of poverty.
This unevenness already affects millions under a 1.5°C
increase, and likely many more under a 2°C warming,
particularly in low-latitude and low- and middle-income
countries. With respect to global aggregate impacts,
risks appear still moderate at both temperature levels.
Yet, again, aggregate measures such as impacts on a na-
tion’s GDP mask asset losses and dangers to livelihoods
of the poor and disenfranchised across regions. The
poorest are often too poor to make a dent in GDP. Or
they engage in the informal sector not captured in na-
tional statistics. Also, these aggregate assessments do
not include large-scale singular events or the irreversibil-
ity of impacts, meaning that danger levels are likely
underestimated in the color ranges of the Reasons for
Concern graphic.
The take-home message was threefold: first, critical
thresholds for communities and society do not result
from global aggregates as implied in the summary figure
Reasons for Concern, but from locally experienced real-
ities. Second, critical thresholds of climate stressors
occur in combination with other stressors and jointly
exacerbate livelihood struggles, especially among disad-
vantaged populations. Third, rather than debating a glo-
bal temperature average that poorly reflects localized
manifestations of imminent danger, a more adequate
Tschakert Climate Change Responses  (2015) 2:3 Page 8 of 11yardstick to assess thresholds for climate insecurity may
be needed. This could include monitoring at the local
level when and why people transition from acceptable to
unacceptable in their livelihood decisions.
The SED4 discussion between parties and experts fur-
ther substantiated these points, in a rhetorically remark-
able pattern. The large majority of parties are intimately
familiar with the text in the approved AR5 summary
documents as well as the underlying chapters. Nonethe-
less, in order to get specific insights on record within
the UNFCCC protocol, several delegates started their in-
terventions with ‘On page x of chapter y, you state z.
Can you confirm that?’ As IPCC authors of these texts,
we typically can and are delighted to explain further.
One question from Singapore was framed to underscore,
for the records in the review process, that certain risks
were already catastrophic for people and natural systems
in their region while only moderate in the aggregate.
Along the same lines, Ethiopia re-emphasized the un-
even distribution of risks for the African continent
which masks regional and sectoral dangers. Others, such
as Bolivia and Palau, wanted to hear confirmed the cru-
cial role of and recognition for indigenous knowledge
for adaptation. Brazil, albeit accepting the possibility of a
limit at 1.5°C, questioned whether temperature was in-
deed the only available metric to take into consideration
for a long-term global goal. Botswana raised the subject
of costs for mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage,
technology transfer, and finance associated with both
temperature targets and avoidance of danger zones.
Trinidad and St. Lucia stressed regional differences in
risk from ice sheet loss and coral bleaching. Finally, the
United States suggested a qualitative decision framework
and place-specific risk assessments that would allow
characterizing differential impacts and risks under a
1.5°C and a 2°C world in a holistic manner.
The consensus that transpired during this SED4, al-
though it remained for the parties to articulate, was that
a 2°C danger level seemed utterly inadequate given the
already observed impacts on ecosystems, food, liveli-
hoods, and sustainable development, and the progres-
sively higher risks and lower adaptation potential with
rising temperatures, combined with disproportionate
vulnerability. In fact, the AR5 states that limits to adap-
tation are expected at all levels of global average
temperature increase, 1.5°C included. The poor and
disadvantaged in particular, and threatened ecosys-
tems, are already in multiple danger zones and any
additional temperature increase, coupled with other
climatic hazards, would further exacerbate precarious
conditions. Echoing Michael Mann’s assessment of the
colored risks on the precursor version of the Reasons
for Concern graphic from 2009, ‘it would seem diffi-
cult for the risk averse among us to accept anythingabove… ~1°C … where the distribution of impacts begins
to weigh heavily toward being adverse across diverse re-
gions’ [30]. One may argue that even those who inhabit
the temperate regions, are most privileged, or ‘feel lucky’
(in Mann’s terms) would find it troubling to justify a 2°C
danger limit, given the growing signals for future harm.
A low temperature target is the best bet to prevent se-
vere, pervasive, and potentially irreversible impacts while
allowing ecosystems to adapt naturally, ensuring food
production and security, and enabling economic develop-
ment to proceed in a sustainable manner, as prescribed
in the convention.
Conclusions
Significant negative impacts, limits to adaptation, and
anticipated worsening of trends from a 0.8°C warming
since pre-industrial times onwards already indicate a
clear need for strengthening the long-term global goal.
The jury from the entire 2013–2015 Review is still out—
the final report is expected for June 2015—and, thus, no
particular reference to an explicit 1.5°C target is included
in the Lima Call for Climate Action. Yet, specific re-
marks with respect to this lower temperature limit were
made throughout the COP negotiations, particularly in
the context of the ADP preambular paragraphs (the
drafting of a new agreement) and adaptation discussions
[31]. For instance, Tuvalu for the LDCs requested to
keep temperature increase below 1.5°C. South Africa
stressed the need for the long-term goal to be consistent
with science results while the EU called for explicit ref-
erence to the 2°C target [31]. With the currently imple-
mented mitigation policies, however, the world is likely
on track to 3.7°C–4.8°C warming by 2100 [32]. At this
point, let us consider the realistic prospects, require-
ments, and associated costs for staying below a 1.5°C
warming throughout the 21st century.
IPCC results suggest that limiting temperature in-
crease to <1.5°C by 2100 would require concentration of
less than 430 ppm CO2-eq [23,32] (see also Table 1),
an enormous challenge. Efforts to link, in one single
graphic illustration, temperature targets from the Reasons
for Concern with cumulative CO2 emissions by 2100 (with
an uncertainty range) and emission reductions required
by 2050 resulted in the arguably most compelling inte-
grative IPCC chart ever, depicted in Figure 3 and pre-
sented at SED4 in Lima. Under the best case scenario,
such an ambitious target would mean peaking close to
1.5°C by mid-century before slowly declining to below
this level. While the literature on the feasibility of
reaching this target remains scarce, aggressive mitiga-
tion strategies would be fundamental, without any
further delay. This entails not only swift global cooper-
ation and exemplary institutional agreements but also
massive investments in decarbonizing the global economy
Figure 3 The relationship between risks from climate change, temperature change, cumulative CO2 emissions, and changes in annual
GHG emissions by 2050. The pink plume is from WGI complex models and includes the uncertainty from non-CO2 gases and climate and carbon
cycle uncertainty, using the likely range. The ellipses show results from the WGIII models, using a simple climate model, not including climate and carbon
cycle uncertainty. The red lines are an example of how to read the figure; they are not included in the version of the released Synthesis Report. Special
thanks to Stéphane Hallegate and IPCC colleagues for guiding authors and parties through this application. The horizontal red line in the top part of the
figure indicates a 1.5°C warming over pre-industrial times, connected to cumulative CO2 emission levels, for the average climate response (solid vertical
line down), for large climate sensitivity (dotted vertical line down to the left of the solid line), and for low climate sensitivity (dotted vertical line down to
the right of the solid line). Through the horizontal lines in the bottom part of the graphic, levels of risks can now be connected to GHG emission changes
by 2050, again for an average climate response and high- and low-sensitivity scenarios. Added uncertainty arises from action on non-CO2 gases, timing
of pre-2050 action, and ambition of post-2050 action [23,35].
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as well as substantial and early negative emissions,
particularly carbon dioxide removal strategies such
as carbon capture and storage (CCS). Yet, some CCS
strategies are technologically not yet available, too
costly, too risky, or not ready to be scaled up, while
bioenergy-driven CCS triggers competition over land
and may well threaten food security. Delaying action
will substantially increase costs, with mitigation costs
already highest for Africa [22], and likely close the
small window available. While some argue that a 1.5°Cscenario is still feasible, others judge it as no longer
within reach [12,33,34].
Without a doubt, it is in the utmost interest of a large
number of countries to pursue the 1.5°C target, as ambi-
tious or idealistic it may appear to date, and to see it
anchored as a binding goal in the next agreement, as a
possible outcome of the 2013–2015 Review. Parties like
small island states and many others whose vulnerability
is extremely high and their survival at stake are the
most vocal. Their persistence is particularly crucial in
the absence of other, more, and more tangible and
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Kennel [12] call them ‘vital signs of planetary health’,
potentially including CO2 concentrations, ocean heat
content, high-latitude temperatures, locally valued re-
sources, and actual, experienced human stress or distress.
But such alternative metrics that motivate change in peo-
ple’s actions and policy making will not be available for
COP21 in Paris in 2015. There may also be another rea-
son why many parties support the strengthening of the
long-term global goal toward a lower target, against all
odds, and why others are vehemently opposed to it, des-
pite growing indication of unacceptable harm and dan-
ger. This additional reason is highly political and closely
tied to a different topic of negotiation at recent COPs,
and equally fiercely debated—loss and damage.
Loss and damage was first considered under the
Cancun Adaptation Framework of 2010. It considers ap-
proaches to address loss and damage that are associated
with climate change impacts in developing countries
that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects
of climate change. COP19 produced the Warsaw
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage asso-
ciated with Climate Change Impacts. It pays particular
attention to extreme weather and slow onset events and
requests Annex I countries to provide finance, technol-
ogy, and capacity building to developing countries. For
AOSIS, the LDCs, and the African Group, it has been
crucial to distinguish loss and damage and associated
financial commitments from adaptation as the former
addresses limits to adaptation under extreme events or
potentially irreversible conditions. Equally important for
the same parties in Lima was the inclusion of a loss
and damage paragraph as a distinct element into the
scope of the 2015 agreement, yet opposed by the United
States, Japan, Australia, The Russian Federation, and
Switzerland [31].
The unevenness of the political landscape in discus-
sions around 1.5°C/2°C as well as loss and damage is
staggering. Analogous to Seager’s [14] and Liverman’s
[15] claims with respect to differential interpretations of
dangerous interference, this unevenness epitomizes
geographies of privilege, power, and inequality. For the
LDCs and AOSIS, where impacts are already felt most
severely, a 1.5°C target enshrined in a 2015 agreement
would not only constitute a legally binding goal. It would
also, perhaps ultimately more importantly, provide a
potential justification for earlier and higher loss and
damage compensation in the (likely) case the target is
exceeded. This could well be a way of addressing in-
equity through the backdoor. Crossing a signpost signals
failure, failure of the international community to protect,
and it would allow all of us to hold our elites account-
able [36]. In practical terms, this could mean millions
and trillions of US$, even if such funds could neverreplace lost land or livelihoods. For less vulnerable na-
tions endowed with high national income and located in
less risk-prone exposure latitudes, the stakes in the loss
and damage debate tied to a lower temperature target
are enormous. Combining a strengthened long-term glo-
bal goal and loss and damage compensation, especially
outside of adaptation finance, would represent a massive
financial obligation for the rich world, for decades to
come.
The crux of the matter is no longer about the scientific
validity of one temperature target over another, although
debates are likely to continue for a while, nor about the
likelihood of crossing a computational global threshold
at a specific point in time. Neither is it about conducting
more studies or running more sophisticated simulations
on lower temperature targets or CO2-eq concentrations,
knowing that those we have to date are scarce and the
targets essentially impossible to reach. It is first and fore-
most about overcoming deeply entrenched divisions on
value judgments, responsibility, and finance. It is about
our respective willingness to understand and buffer
against risks and to pay for abatement and compensa-
tion, not merely about reaching or not reaching a single-
index number goal. It is about acknowledging that
negative impacts of climate change under a 0.8°C
temperature increase are already widespread, across
the globe, and that danger, risk, and harm would be
utterly unacceptable in a 2°C warmer world, largely
for ‘them’—the mollusks, and coral reefs, and the
poor and marginalized populations, not only in poor
countries—even if this danger has not quite hit home
yet for ‘us’. And this is why this political process is
so extraordinarily difficult and slow, and nonetheless
necessary.
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